Half the entropy is trying to figure out which pieces of this article's text are supposed to be the silly falsehoods being corrected, and which pieces are just the second or third paragraph of a preceding 'Fact'. Deadpool is easier to follow.
I saw a note from an earlier year's discussion saying the css has been changed over the years. Perhaps it was easier then to discern fact or myth, truth or fiction.
This is a good place as any to ask, last time I didn't get any answer: has there ever been a serious Linux exploit from manipulating/predicting bad PRNG? Apart from the Debian SSH key generation fiasco from years ago, of course.
Having a good entropy source makes mathematical sense, and you want something a bit more "random" than a dice roll, but I wonder at which point it becomes security theatre.
Of all the possible avenues for exploiting a modern OS might have, I figure kernel PRNG prediction to be very, very far down the list of things to try.
> Note from 2024: This article was published on March 16th, 2014. It is still correct in its discussion of entropy and randomness, but the Linux kernel random number generator has been reworked several times since then and does not look like this anymore. Good news: the separation between /dev/urandom and /dev/random is practically gone.
My understanding is that on modern Linux system:
At early boot phases, /dev/random can still block, because not enough entropy has been seeded yet. /dev/urandom will not block, but the random data might be of poor quality and not suitable for crypto purposes. This happens very early in the boot, so probably it's not even possible to run user stuff at this time. At least on my laptop, the message "random: crng init done" gets logged almost instantly after boot and long before even initrd starts. Might be different for exotic platforms, I guess.
Once there was enough entropy seeded, both /dev/random and /dev/urandom works identically, they don't block and they return high quality random data. So for most userspace purposes, these files can be used interchangeably, one is not better than another.
> Might be different for exotic platforms, I guess.
Short-lived isolated VMs (like might be used for CI) are one place where entropy can be a problem. The relevant definition of “platform” here is less about the CPU architecture and more about the environment.
Having a good entropy source makes mathematical sense, and you want something a bit more "random" than a dice roll, but I wonder at which point it becomes security theatre.
Of all the possible avenues for exploiting a modern OS might have, I figure kernel PRNG prediction to be very, very far down the list of things to try.
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7359992
Also:
2020: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22683627
2018: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17779657
2017: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13332741
2015: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10149019
> Note from 2024: This article was published on March 16th, 2014. It is still correct in its discussion of entropy and randomness, but the Linux kernel random number generator has been reworked several times since then and does not look like this anymore. Good news: the separation between /dev/urandom and /dev/random is practically gone.
My understanding is that on modern Linux system:
At early boot phases, /dev/random can still block, because not enough entropy has been seeded yet. /dev/urandom will not block, but the random data might be of poor quality and not suitable for crypto purposes. This happens very early in the boot, so probably it's not even possible to run user stuff at this time. At least on my laptop, the message "random: crng init done" gets logged almost instantly after boot and long before even initrd starts. Might be different for exotic platforms, I guess.
Once there was enough entropy seeded, both /dev/random and /dev/urandom works identically, they don't block and they return high quality random data. So for most userspace purposes, these files can be used interchangeably, one is not better than another.
Short-lived isolated VMs (like might be used for CI) are one place where entropy can be a problem. The relevant definition of “platform” here is less about the CPU architecture and more about the environment.